

The Joint Strike Force: A Capability to Meet the Strategic Requirements in 2020

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**The Joint Strike Force: A Capability to Meet the
Strategic Requirements in 2020**

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Student requirement for SAW Lesson 7402

Presented to:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Joint Strike Force: A Capability to Meet the Strategic Requirements in 2020

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Thesis: *The organizational paradigm must shift from the current joint headquarters design to a more adaptive and flexible structure to support rapid decisive operations that can respond to world-wide future threats and decisively achieve national security objectives.*

Discussion: Many factors differentiate the Joint Strike Force (JSF) from a Joint Task Force (JTF). Two distinguishing characteristics that limit the JTF's operational capability include the activation process in forming a headquarters, and the ad hoc nature associated with establishing a new staff. These factors seem to imply that current JTF operational procedures need modification.

The establishment and activation process of a JTF requires an inordinate amount of coordination and cooperation. Because of the lack of training and continuity associated with a new JTF, the propensity to coordinate more exists because units lack vertical and lateral relationships. Given the time required and the activation process for standing up a JTF, this seemingly inevitable problem continues to detract from the JTF's ability to operate effectively. The future requires that US military power possess capabilities that can respond rapidly, efficiently, and with accurate precision; a requirement that an ad-hoc JTF cannot accomplish. The very nature of what the JSF's operational procedures accomplish eliminate these potential shortcomings.

The Joint Strike Force (JSF) resembles a multi-service designated force with certain rapid offensive capabilities. The Joint Strike Force is a rapidly deployable, combined arms force capable of limited intervention operations in an upper level, small-scale contingency in the future. Deploying directly into the Joint Operations Area, the JSF arrives with significant combat power (to include ground forces) within 24 - 96 hrs. The JSF conducts rapid, decisive operations against the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities.

The availability and use of time certainly distinguishes the JSF from a typical JTF, especially when considering time to train. The JSF provides a new option for the National Command Authorities, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Unified Combatant Commands.

Conclusion(s): The JSF concept possesses capabilities that can deal with anti-access and asymmetric threats by countering such threats through Rapid Decisive Operations and Effects-Based Operations. Conventional operations are less likely to occur, making JTF procedures irrelevant. The JSF concept eliminates obsolete procedures common to JTFs. Adopting the JSF concept would eliminate friction points between the theater CINCs, the services, and the components because relationships would already exist, and there would be no need to start from zero.

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The mere thought of future warfare causes one to think beyond the scope of reality, and prepares one to think of innovative ways to deal with future change. Futuristic thinking focuses on the adaptation to change, especially in an uncertain environment. Change occurs around the clock, twenty-four hours a day, because nothing remains constant but change itself. If this statement is true, then we must continue searching for better ways to meet future challenges over the next twenty years and beyond. The organization of today's military forces resembles a structure suitable for current threats; however, adequately responding to tomorrow's threats will require innovative advances in organization and capabilities. The changing environment suggests that the threats of tomorrow will add new meaning to uncertainty and chaos. The future use of anti-access and asymmetric tactics by potential adversaries will place United States interests, as well as those of its allies, at risk through direct attack, credible threats, or more subtle means of intimidation.¹ This dynamic seems to demand a change in the way we think, organize, and equip to fight in the future. The future operational environment consisting of current, as well as future threats, will force us to alter the way we conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

The US military currently employs Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to respond to regional contingencies for finite periods to satisfy requirements in achieving national security objectives. The uncertain future of conflict seems to threaten the validity of the JTF concept because of the *amount of time* it takes to respond to potential crises. One begs the question, therefore, whether current JTFs can respond quickly enough to decisively achieve objectives when faced with uncertain, yet time-sensitive future threats. This ongoing problem constantly raises debate because the current command and control architecture requires us to establish "come as you are" Joint Task Forces. As part of a deliberate activation process, current JTFs need sufficient time to set up, establish command and control links, and function as a staff before it can effectively operate as a headquarters element. Under time-sensitive conditions, these procedures take too long to accomplish and reduce any chance to respond quickly to changing threats. The current JTF's procedures require and depend upon a time

element that future operations suggest will be less available to operate in. *Therefore, the organizational paradigm must shift from the current joint headquarters design to a more adaptive and flexible structure to support rapid decisive operations that can respond to world-wide future threats and decisively achieve national security objectives.* The security environment in 2020, based upon predicted change, requires the United States to possess forces that can shape the battlespace by pre-empting enemy actions or responding in a timely manner to decisively counter enemy actions. The Joint Strike Force is the future force structure of choice. It represents relevant capabilities that will carry us into the future.

The **Joint Strike Force (JSF)** resembles a multi-service force with certain rapid offensive capabilities. Perhaps a more precise definition clarifies this point:

The Joint Strike Force is a rapidly deployable, combined arms force capable of limited intervention operations in an upper level, small-scale contingency in the future. Deploying directly into the Joint Operations Area, the JSF arrives with significant combat power (to include ground forces) within 24 – 96 hrs. The JSF conducts rapid, decisive operations against the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities. The JSF is able to sustain itself for the duration of the operation (up to 30 days) even in the absence of local supply bases.²

Closer examination of the definition reveals that the JSF rapidly deploys forces within 24-96 hours, conducts rapid decisive operations, and possesses limited sustainment capability. This implies that every major activity depends upon the critical element of time, which also serves as the base line. Specifically, the JSF can have forces positioned in theater ready for operations in less than four days. This concept also prescribes the approximate length of time in which it takes the JSF to conduct the decisive operations, to include the sustainment required.

In support of JSF, **Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO)** serve as a guiding integrating concept. This emerging concept fits into the equation as indicated in the JSF's definition. RDO describe the conduct and execution of military actions taken by agile, adaptive forces using relevant capabilities to achieve definitive effects. RDO state the following:

Rapid Decisive Operations is a concept designed to achieve victory by attacking the coherence of an enemy's ability to fight. It is the synchronous application of the full range of our national capabilities in

timely and effects-based operations. They employ our asymmetric advantages in knowledge, precision, and mobility of the joint force against enemy critical functions to create maximum shock, defeating his ability and will to fight.³

Analysis of RDO reveals similar principles and characteristics that are currently contained in maneuver warfare. RDO focuses on achieving the advantage through mobility; it pits friendly strengths (capabilities) against enemy critical functions (weaknesses and vulnerabilities); and attacks the coherence of the enemy's will to fight (shatters the enemy's cohesion by attacking his center of gravity). The definitions of RDO and maneuver warfare look very similar with one exception. RDO focuses on *precision and speed* relative to *time*, while maneuver warfare relies on positional advantages to capitalize on strengths against weaknesses.

Timing and responsiveness are the common critical factors. RDO also relies on information superiority coupled with precision engagement capabilities to generate maximum impact on the enemy, while reducing the deployment and sustainment requirements through lighter forces and a more moderate, smaller, logistics footprint.⁴ Thus, RDO stresses rapidity and decisiveness by striking quickly at a precise location, creating conditions that deny the enemy any ability to achieve his objectives. By limiting the enemy any opportunity to achieve his objectives, while simultaneously generating in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat, the attacker retains the initiative and advantage.⁵

Briefly reflecting back to the JSF definition, it becomes apparent that a linkage and common thread exists among the concepts of JSF, RDO, and **Effects-Based Operations (EBO)**. EBO represent the military *operational* and *tactical actions* taken to achieve desired effects with strategic implications. In fact, the most successful effects-based operations involve all aspects of national power (political, military, economic, etc.).⁶ The following definition provides more amplifying details associated with military power:

Effects-based operations (EBO) is the early, concentrated, near-simultaneous application of lethal and non-lethal effects from air, land, and sea to achieve quick, successful termination of combat contingency operations.⁷ The reaction time required to accomplish the mission and the effects achieved

determines success. EBO emphasizes the concentrated application of fires, maneuver, and deception to draw an adversary from secure positions, determines its most important nodes and capabilities, and renders the enemy incapable of orchestrating an effective response.⁸

EBO focus primarily on speed, synchronization, and concentration. By applying all available capabilities in a near simultaneous effort, a concentrated effect occurs that renders the adversary incapable of effective response. EBO also indicate that the adversary occupies secure positions, implying a defensive mindset. If the adversary acts and responds according to the definition, then the attacker retains the advantage because EBO emphasizes rapid, fast tempo offensive operations.⁹

Furthermore, EBO focus on deterring aggression, quickly gaining the initiative, generating rapid decisive *effects*, limiting enemy options, and exploiting potential synergy.¹⁰ Keep in mind that, achieving these objectives occurs near simultaneously. Perhaps the overall objective of EBO is to apply a desired effect to achieve a specified purpose (shaping, protective, decisive) in time and space, vice simply servicing targets as acquired. Firepower and attrition are essential components of warfare¹¹ that supports the doctrinal Elements of Combat Power - Maneuver, Firepower, Protection and Leadership. The notion of *Effects* is a revolutionary approach that realizes the potential of non-lethal capabilities and their relevance to the changing nature of the threat and today's operational environment. Thus, the application of lethal and non-lethal fires to achieve specific effects must be fully nested within the JSF's concept of the operation.¹²

The JSF illustrates an overarching conceptual hierarchy. Integrating and employing concepts such as Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Effects-Based Operations (EBO) fully complement this notional design. RDO links EBO to the JSF concept, and parallels the construct of strategic, operational, and tactical level operations. As the JSF includes one integrating concept, RDO comprises supporting concepts. Of the several ideas discussed, EBO provide a more understandable view because it interacts directly and indirectly with JSF, RDO, and other supporting and employment concepts. The JSF provides a new option for the National Command Authorities, the

U.S. Department of Defense, and the Unified Combatant Commands. The JSF also enables the geographic CINC's to provide the National Command Authority with a means of rapidly responding to upper level, small-scale contingencies (i.e. Kosovo, Panama, Haiti).¹³ Thus, the JSF concept provides flexible options that current JTF procedures cannot match.

Unlike a JTF, the JSF headquarters design represents a paradigm shift in organizational structure that will maintain relevance well into the 21st century. The JSF uses mission-tailored forces. The exact size and composition of the JSF depends upon the particular mission. The command and control aspects of the JSF headquarters parallel and align with the geographical CINC's headquarters element in the specific area of operations where the assigned missions will occur.¹⁴ The JSF headquarters composition consists of functional tasks and information. Unlike the normal hierarchical command and control structure associated with a typical JTF, the JSF headquarters uses a network-centric model that includes functional cells (**See Figure 1**). The JSF headquarters element consists of a forward deployable element and a fixed element embedded in and permanently aligned with each geographical CINC headquarters. These split-based operations receive support by assured connectivity and information technologies to facilitate in-stride planning and execution through a distributed and collaborative command and control network.¹⁵ While this command and control arrangement may appear complex and manpower intensive, one point remains plausible: that future technological enhancements will increase the ability to operate more efficiently and effectively, thus providing flexible options as to how we organize, train and fight.

Many other factors differentiate the JSF from the JTF. Perhaps, the activation process required in establishing a JTF, and the ad hoc nature associated with JTFs pose the biggest limitations in the current structure. The future requires that US military power possess capabilities that can respond rapidly, efficiently, and with accurate precision; a requirement that an ad-hoc JTF cannot accomplish. By the JSF and the CINC headquarters being co-located, and the mere fact that JTFs are not integral parts of any campaign plans distinguish the JSF from the current JTF design, and

highlights a major shortfall. The JSF HQ is a JTF-like headquarters capable of performing all the functions necessary to command and control the allocated joint forces. By incorporating technological enhancements, the JSF HQ increases its capability to effectively command and control joint forces. The very nature of what the JSF's operational procedures accomplish identifies capabilities not resident in current JTF procedures. These apparent limitations seem to imply that current JTF operational procedures need modification.

The establishment and activation process of a JTF requires an inordinate amount of coordination and cooperation, due to a lack of established communication relationships. Since staff to staff relationships start upon activation, the natural progression suggests that more coordination will occur in the beginning and taper off as staffs grow accustomed to each other's operational procedures. With coordination, an equal or greater degree of cooperation exists as staffs learn to function and operate together, internally as well as externally. Because of the lack of training and continuity associated with a new JTF, the necessity for more coordination exists because units lack vertical and lateral relationships. Establishing a JTF without an experienced core staff also requires more coordination and cooperation than normal because of the personalities involved and the lack of staff-to-staff relationships. By its very nature, this ongoing process never reaches full maturity. Maintaining regionally established, standing headquarters with habitual relationships eliminates unnecessary coordination and cooperation. In an after action report on Operation ALLIED FORCE, the CJTF commander, Admiral Ellis stated that, "the JTF was not formed around a pre-designated (and trained) theater staff"¹⁶ implying that the excess time it took to develop intra habitual relationships wasted valuable time that normally comes with training and working together.

The activation process also faces numerous challenges in identifying training requirements, accomplishing a standard level of proficiency as a staff, and developing habitual relationships within the staff, all the while conducting real-world operations. When does training occur? It often does not

happen because of a lack of available time. The availability and use of time certainly distinguishes the JSF from a typical JTF, especially when considering time to train.

Since the JSF headquarters is co-located with the CINC headquarters, inherent training practices will develop and maintain the habitual relationships necessary for effective command, improve lines of communication, identify seams and friction points, and ensure combat readiness in the event of a real-world contingency. This training will take place not only within the JSF, but also as part of the CINC's daily engagement activities, thus improving the ability of the CINC to engage in combined operations.¹⁷ Integration with the CINC headquarters allows the JSF to participate in theater engagement and campaign planning, a function currently not accomplished by JTF's.

The organizational structure of the JSF would allow full integration of existing conceptual, operational, and functional plans. As an integral part of the CINC's headquarters, the JSF headquarters participates in the development and revision of plans. This fact implies that the JSF maintains familiarity with existing plans, while periodically conducting updates based on available information. Automatically, the JSF's staff and commander achieve enhanced levels of situational awareness by maintaining real-time data in support of its region. Current JTFs cannot exploit this capability. Because of the nature of establishing and disestablishing JTFs, it is virtually impossible to designate forces for specific campaigns and theater engagement plans for short periods. The current force structure does not allow for this type of arrangement. By not working together on a permanent basis, a recipe for disaster exist because a newly formed JTF would struggle in planning, developing, and executing a campaign plan, especially if it starts from ground zero.

The JSF concept includes a continuous training cycle as compared to a reactionary training cycle of a JTF. Currently, JTF procedures are the result of lessons learned from past operations and the JTFs only receive training during periods of crises. Although JTF operational procedures remain relevant for today's operations, its primary training focus centers on conventional operations. Current JTFs place virtually no training emphasis on future operations involving RDO and EBO because of

the lack of time available and the lack of permanent personnel to maintain and manage a training program. Of course, if the JTF is not a permanent, standing headquarters, the likelihood to allocate funds to a temporary headquarters is minimal. Conversely, the JSF concept has time available to concentrate on internal and external training requirements, and requires dedicated funding to train and operate. Internal training focuses on improving command relationships, improving lines of communication between the headquarters and the aligned joint forces, identifying and resolving seams and friction points, and ensuring combat effectiveness, as well as language abilities and knowledge of local situations.¹⁸ By maintaining a permanent headquarters staff, the staff-to-staff relationships receive peacetime training vertically and laterally, and are better prepared than JTF staffs that receive training only by reacting to crisis.

External training requires greater coordination due to the alignment of subordinate forces and the time available. During peacetime, such components have organizational training requirements to fulfill that limit training time with higher headquarters. Planned, high-level training exercises focusing on command communications procedures, deployment movement exercises, and large-scale field exercises, however, must occur to maintain otherwise operational procedures and perishable unit skills. In essence, training translates into execution once operations commence. Having a standing JSF reinforces this point.

Operationally, the standing JSF possesses a marked advantage over a JTF because of its ability to affect operations quicker through RDO and EBO. Arguably, a JTF executing conventional operations against a future adversary would be less effective than a more agile, adaptive force with relevant capabilities. The JSF concentrates on rapidly synchronizing technological advantages in communications, supporting arms (lethal and non-lethal), and mobility of forces to create favorable conditions for success. By maintaining a standing joint headquarters, the JSF can execute RDO and EBO with speed, decisiveness and lethality, presenting a remarkable advantage over the current JTF's

abilities. This reason alone gives amplification why we should shift our way of thinking and adopt new procedures, those common to the JSF concept.

Without a permanent, standing JTF headquarters, which we currently do not have to support warfighting contingencies, our ability to effectively deal with a free-thinking enemy will be extremely difficult. The JSF concept will allow us to impose our will on an unconstrained adversary by employing dedicated forces while executing RDO and EBO. Future success depends on two factors, one, maintaining permanent joint headquarters that can rapidly respond to crises around the globe, and second, dedicating forces that the JSF can employ into theater within 24-96 hours to conduct RDO. Otherwise, we will continue the rudimentary procedures in activating a JTF in a reactionary fashion.

The formation of ad hoc staffs in support of joint operations limits the flexibility and effectiveness of a JTF's ability to operate, and questions whether the current JTF procedures are relative for future operations. If future adversaries present asymmetric threats and possess similar capabilities that allow them to operate quicker and more decisive, then one could argue that forming a JTF after the fact makes no sense. Because of the transient nature of JTFs, their staffs rarely train together and develop the habitual relationships essential to efficient staff work. Additionally, the newly formed staffs' personnel lack the quantitative and qualitative skills required for effectiveness.

The notion of ad hoc staffs implies that personnel, which make up the staff, lack certain skills, but the obvious fact remains that ad hoc staffs serve specific purposes that can detract from flexibility. Essentially, what a staff receives is what it gets. Having permanent personnel as part of the headquarters staff, similar to the JSF, eliminates potential shortfalls associated with ad hoc staffs and defuses tenuous dynamics associated with typical JTF headquarters.

The availability of personnel to fill newly formed staffs without planned provisions suggest that the services are reluctant to give up quality personnel for unspecified periods of time. This seemingly apparent shortage of personnel has always sparked attention. Generally, all services

accept the position that a shortage of personnel precludes them from giving up quality personnel to support newly formed JTFs. Many perceive this shortcoming as a severe impediment to the realization of the full potential of joint warfighting.¹⁹ With the JSF concept a standing joint headquarters would eliminate the short-term problem associated with personnel.

The long-term issue over personnel poses several other concerns. Where do the personnel come from that make up the standing JSF headquarters element? How many JSF headquarters are required to cover future regional threats? How large are these headquarters elements? With current downsizing remaining a major concern, the force structure must take into account the need for additional forces in support of future threats. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 authorizes forces that make up the current force structure. In order to create additional staff organizations that obviously require additional personnel, a reorganization of forces may be required. Does this imply that the Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986 needs revision? Perhaps the following phrase appropriately stresses the need to look for alternative ways reorganize. In his book, *Thriving on Chaos*, Tom Peters states that, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' A more applicable adaptation might be: 'If it ain't broke, you haven't looked hard enough'.²⁰ The establishment of standing joint headquarters for the future marks a positive step in the right direction. Of course, the other option of taking personnel from existing force structures and assigning them to permanent standing joint headquarters remains a likely although unpopular alternative. If this approach takes place, then the old phrase of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" certainly comes into play.

In order to fulfill future requirements a minimum of five standing JSF headquarters are recommended, one permanently assigned to each geographical/regional CINC, consisting of fixed and deployable elements. Under regular peacetime conditions, the JSF headquarters element fills multiple roles and responsibilities as part of the CINC's headquarters. These designated personnel serve as the non-deployable JSF staff and supports the forward-deployable staff. The remaining personnel assigned to the standing JSF headquarters will be embedded in the CINC headquarters. At

the commencement of mission tasking, those personnel assigned to the CINC headquarters that have additional duties associated to the JSF will assume these as primary duties. During crises, the JSF headquarters assumes its primary role of warfighting with its deployable headquarters element that forward deploys to command and control the assigned joint forces conducting the mission. If the tempo and number of operations conducted in the recent past is any indication of what the future holds, can one JSF headquarters realistically manage and control multiple operations? If so, how does it maintain flexibility? Future technological advances in command, control, communication, and computer systems will allow the JSF to control multiple operations and possess "reach back" capabilities to compensate for potential shortfalls. Otherwise, each CINC would need at least two JSF headquarters elements to achieve full flexibility. This increases the number of JSFs to a total of ten, placing even greater demands on reorganization.

The size, organization, and composition of the standing JSF headquarters depends on the make up of the various cells, the function and action required of those cells, and the available technology that could potentially streamline manpower demands. As illustrated in **(Figure 2)**, the JSF organization consists of two elements; a fixed headquarters element and a deployable headquarters element. The JSF fixed headquarters element consists of a Deputy Commander, an Effects Cell, an Information and Operations Cell, a Logistics Cell, the Special Staff, and a Communications Element. The JSF fixed element consists of approximately 300²¹ personnel, broken down into two shifts.²² To fulfill the manning requirements for five JSF headquarters elements, a total of fifteen hundred (1500) personnel would be required, and for ten JSF standing headquarters, approximately three thousand personnel. These figures do not include the JSF deployable headquarters element that consists of the commander, his battle staff cell, and similar cells to correspond with the fixed headquarters element. Each JSF deployable headquarters would consist of approximately fifty (50) personnel, including two shifts.²³ This implies that approximately two

hundred and fifty (250) personnel would be needed to meet the manning requirements for five JSF deployable headquarters elements and five hundred (500) personnel for ten.

By future standards, existing response capabilities take a relatively long time to deploy forces into theater and employ those forces in an area of operations. Operation DESERT STORM serves as a great example of where it took time to build the "iron mountains" necessary for the conduct of combined arms operations against the Iraqi military. More recently, Operation ALLIED FORCE experienced difficulty deploying and employing forces rapidly against the Serbian military. While these delays present many possible and plausible explanations, the necessity to develop new and innovative approaches for deploying, sustaining, and employing joint forces remains as a top priority.²⁴ The structure and establishment of the JSF would reduce these potential shortfalls because relationships between the theater CINCs, the services, and the components would already exist, allowing habitual relationships to remain relevant. Numerous studies and papers written on the benefit of creating permanent standing joint organizations²⁵ almost all arrive to the same conclusion, that such standing headquarters require additional personnel that the services currently do not possess. Personnel shortages represent the number one obstacle in establishing a JSF headquarters. Even today, the services simply cannot meet the joint billet requirements. Many argue that JSF headquarters naturally create more joint billets. Arguably, the use of future technologically advanced command and control systems by the JSF headquarters will actually help minimize personnel requirements to fill these joint billets. Finally, the issue that poses the greatest challenge in joint force operations is the ability of the headquarters element to effectively command and control the joint forces assigned. Under normal operating conditions, a joint headquarters requires roughly 30-60 days of working with components and staffs before gaining adequate proficiency. Without procedural changes in joint training and better ways to increase overall efficiency and effectiveness within joint headquarters elements, JTF's will continue to lack fusion and cohesion between the

headquarters element, the CINC, and the components. The success of future operations heavily depends upon the establishment of the JSF concept.

The greatest strength of the JSF is its adaptable command and control structure. The rigid command and control structures of present JTFs must give way to future command arrangements possessing more flexible options that counter uncertainty. Martin Van Creveld states that, "uncertainty being the central fact that all command systems have to cope with, the role of uncertainty in determining the structure of command should be—and in most cases is—decisive."²⁶ The JSF concept prescribes a command relationship that synchronizes a standing headquarters with the warfighting CINCs, and enables the geographical CINCs to provide the National Command Authority with a means to rapidly and decisively respond to small-scale contingencies.²⁷ Arguably, JTFs can do that today, so what is different? The JSF concept places the JSF commander in the exact position as a typical JTF commander with essentially two exceptions: one, that the JSF commander retains a *permanent* status while the JTF commander does not and two, is the ability of the JSF to respond *more rapidly and decisively*.

Current JTF procedures for establishing and disestablishing command headquarters based on requirements do not support RDO. Although a seemingly minor issue on the surface, the implications of these differences reflect a much greater significance because the JSF represents a standing organization within the CINC's headquarters, and its relationship with the CINC is different from traditional JTFs. The JSF, at the CINC's direction, will prepare for and respond to upper-level small-scale contingencies. The standing nature of the JSF also allows the CINC to use his staff to remain focused on his theater engagement strategy, major theater war plans, and other lesser contingencies, some in conjunction with the JSF Headquarters and others separate from the JSF Headquarters.²⁸

The JSF command structure also accounts for direct command and supporting relationships (See Figure 3). Under normal conditions, the JSF commander reports directly to the regional CINC.

In turn, subordinate commanders with aligned joint forces report directly to the JSF commander until such time when the assigned mission terminates. The JSF headquarters and the theater-based headquarters receive support from theater-based forces, CONUS-based forces, and other supporting organizations of specialized design. Under normal operating conditions the JSF standing headquarters maintains a closer habitual relationship with both the CINC and the supporting services that presents a different view from the current relationships. The JSF's ability to exercise operational control of allocated joint forces would be seamless because of existing command relationships. Conversely, current JTFs are not capable of maintaining a similar relationship because of a simultaneous forming of a headquarters and apportioned forces. Reporting directly to the CINC, the JSF enables the CINC to respond rapidly to crises and contingencies, while leveraging the knowledge and expertise resident in the CINC's staff in the pursuit of JSF objectives.

The JSF also uses a different command and control model for employing joint mission-tailored task forces in the conduct of operations, making the JSF commander and traditional service component relationships different.²⁹ Because of these subtle differences, the effectiveness of future military command relationships will depend upon how forces are organized, trained and controlled by headquarters elements, and the interactions between commanders before, during and after operations. The design and structure of the JSF provides relevant and realistic opportunities to achieve goals, something that remains suspect under the current structure of a JTF. To meet the challenges of the future, we must adopt new ways to deal with world-wide threats, and the JSF provides this option.

Conclusions:

The future environment remains uncertain and forever changing. Current JTF procedures lack flexibility and adaptability, and the implications of these shortfalls suggest potential problems. Without dedicated forces that can respond rapidly and decisively to future threats, the US will face problems in dealing with adversaries who possess capabilities similar to us. The critical element of

time required by current JTF's to activate, establish its headquarters, and function as a proficient staff limits any opportunity to respond quickly and decisively to future threats. Future operations demand a shift in the way we employ forces and execute missions. The JSF concept provides this option to the US. Unlike the JTF, the JSF possesses capabilities that can address anti-access and asymmetric threats by countering such threats through RDO and EBO. Conventional operations are less likely to occur, making JTF procedures irrelevant.

The JSF concept eliminates obsolete procedures common to JTFs. The issues associated with activating a JTF in response to crises, and the ad hoc nature that comes with establishing and disestablishing joint headquarters are long gone. The organizational structure of the JSF allows full integration of existing conceptual, operational, and functional plans; a function current JTF's do not perform. The JSF concept provides the NCA more viable options because of its permanent status. The current JTF procedures do not offer this luxury. This reason alone justifies adopting the JSF concept. By the JSF maintaining a continuous training cycle as compared to a reactionary training cycle marks a clear advantage over the JTF, both internally and externally. Perhaps the greatest strength of the JSF is its adaptability and flexibility to command and control, characteristics current JTFs have difficulty countering. Adopting the JSF concept would eliminate friction points between the theater CINCs, the services, and the components because relationships would already exist, and there would be no need to start from zero. Operationally, the standing JSF comprises a marked advantage over a JTF because of its ability to affect operations quicker through RDO and EBO. Current JTF procedures for establishing and disestablishing command headquarters based on requirements do not support RDO. By adopting the JSF concept, the exercise control over joint forces would be much easier than current procedures because of existing command relationships as opposed to relationships that are forming for the very first time. The JTF cannot achieve this by its very nature and the JSF can. The apparent advantages that the JSF concept project over the JTF confirms the need to change.

Endnotes

¹ United States Marine Corps Concept Paper *Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare: A Capstone Concept for Power Projection across the Spectrum of Conflict*, Draft, 03 Nov, 2000, p 2.

² Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, *Joint Strike Force*, Microsoft Power Point Presentation, 18 May 2000, Slide #2.

³ United States Joint Forces Command, *A white Paper for Rapid Decisive Operations*. RDO Draft, Version 1.0, 27 Nov, 2000, p 5.

⁴ RDO Draft, p 6.

⁵ RDO Draft, p 6.

⁶ Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, JAWP, *New perspectives on Effects-Based Operations*, Draft, 6 March 2001, p2.

⁷ Institute of Defense Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWD). Draft Concept Paper: *Early Decisive Operations: A strategic Concept* August 2000, p 6.

⁸ EDO, p 6.

⁹ EDO, p6.

¹⁰ EDO, p 8-9.

¹¹ Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: *Warfighting*, MCDP-1. (Washington, DC: GPO, 20 June 1997), p 38.

¹² JSF, p 48.

¹³ Institute of Defense Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWD). Joint Strike Force Concept paper, 13 September 2000, p 3.

¹⁴ JSF, p 14.

¹⁵ JSF, p 30.

¹⁶ Admiral James O. Ellis Brief. *A view from the Top*. Microsoft Power point Presentation, .slide#8.

¹⁷ JSF, p 15.

¹⁸ JSF, p 15.

¹⁹ JSF, p 5.

²⁰ Thomas J. Peters, *Thriving on Chaos* (New York: Random House, 1987), p 3.

²¹ JSF, p 38. The footnote further describes where the numbers comes from. The number "300," represents two shifts of 150 for each JSF standing headquarters element. This arbitrary number acts as a forcing function. The actual staffing of the JSF Headquarters can only be decided through further exploration and experimentation.

²² JSF, p 38.

²³ JSF, p 46. The number (50) or two shifts of twenty five (25) is designed so that the JSF forward deployed HQ element can command and control forces from mobile platforms, airborne command post and from a command and control ship.

²⁴ JSF, p 5.

²⁵ JSF, p MAJ James Hanley, USAF: JTF Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command, USACGSC-SAMS, May 1996; MAJ Mare Hildenbrand, USA: Standing Joint Task Forces—A Way to Enhance America's Warfighting Capabilities, USACGSC-SAMS, June 92; CDR Bradley Johanson, USN, Staffing the Joint Task Force, an Opportunity for Team Building, Naval War College, June 1995; LTCDR Karl Van Deusen, USN: Joint Vision 2010 Command and Control: A Case for Standing Joint Task Forces and Purple Aircraft Carriers, Naval War College, February 1998; LTC Harry Scott, USA: Joint Task Force Headquarters—Time for Permanency, USAWC, February 1997; MAJ Michael Firlie, USA: NATO Standing Combined Joint Task Forces., JFQ, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000.

²⁶ Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), p 268.

²⁷ JSF, p 13.

²⁸ JSF, p 28.

²⁹ JSF, p 28.

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
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(Figure 1)
JSF Model for Command and Control



(Figure 2)
Deployable and Fixed Headquarters Element

JSF Fixed HQ Organization	JSF Deployable HQ	
Major Command	Major Command	
Commander	Commander	
Deputy Commander	Deputy Commander	
LNO		
Effects Cell	Battle Staff	Effects Cell
I&O Cell		I&O Cell
Logistics Cell		Logistics Cell
Joint Communications Organization	Joint Communications Organization	

(Figure 3)
Command Relationships

